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out that it is possible for a lessor to avoid the results reached
here.
It will not admit of argument that plaintiffs' principal cause
or motive in granting a lease to the defendant was to obtain an
unconditional obligation on the part of defendant to drill on
their land. If this obligation is not obtained, there is an absence
of cause and therefore no contract. 5 Again, it should not admit
of argument that defendant's obligation, which the plaintiffs
were seeking to enforce, was subject to a potestative condition.6
In other words, what appeared at first blush from the written
lease to be an absolute duty to drill turned out to be an illusory
promise.7 This result was doubtless not what the lessor expected.
The solution to the problem is found in careful draftsmanship by the lessor's attorney. Form leases are mainly the product
of "lessee interests," and it seems only natural that lessees would
attempt to secure a mineral lease without running any risks
thereunder.8 "Lessor interests" can be adequately protected by
careful attention to the interrelation of the provisions of the
proposed lease. The draftsman must be sure that "unless"
clauses, surrender clauses, separate forfeiture clauses, and other
provisions do not overlap the obligatory provisions of express
covenants so as to deprive them of their binding quality. Without
exercise -of this precaution, the lessor may be without a remedy
for lessee's failure to drill, as were the plaintiffs in the principal,
case.
John S. Covington

TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH CHILD'S INTEREST
IN NORMAL FILIAL RELATION
Plaintiff, a child, alleged that he had been deprived of his
mother's aid, comfort, kindness, and assistance by defendant's
5. See Arts. 1824-1825, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. For an excellent discussion

of this topic, see Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 2 (1951).

6. See Arts. 2024-2034, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. Cases treating this aspect of
a lease are: Lieber v. Ouachita Natural Gas & Oil Co., 153 La. 160, 95 So.
538 (1922); Raines v. Dunson, 145 La. 525, 82 So. 690 (1919); McClendon v.
Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 722, 70 So. 781 (1916); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v.
Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1913).
7. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 16, 145, 149 (1950).
8. For an interesting account of how such an attempt backfired, see

Noxon v. Union Oil Co. of California, 210 La. 1074, 29 So.24 67 (1946),
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having negligently injured her. He sought to recover damages
for this loss. Held, a motion to dismiss the complaint was sustained. Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C.
1952).
At common law, a husband or parent deprived of the services
of his wife or child by their wrongful injury may recover the
value of those services from the wrongdoer.' In such actions,
the husband is allowed to recover additional damages for the loss
of his wife's society and the interference with the sexual aspect
of their relationship.2 In theory, the parent is allowed to recover
only such damages as might compensate him for the loss of the
child's services. Since accurate evaluation of that loss is usually
impossible, however, it is probable that parents also recover for
the loss of the child's fellowship and society.3 On the other hand,
neither wife nor child can recover from the wrongdoer who
injures the husband or parent the value of the husband's services
and conjugal companionship or of the parent's guidance, society,
and assistance. 4 The traditional explanation of this incongruity
is that, at common law, husbands and parents have a right-akin
to a property right-to the services of their wives and children,
while the latter have no corresponding right to the services of the
husband or parent. 5 This loss-of-services basis of the action by the
husband or parent has been characterized as a mere fiction
employed to grant recovery for the less tangible damage he has
sustained.0 Indeed, the slightest loss of services seems to support
the action.7 In spite of this, only three American jurisdictions
have departed from the traditional view and allowed the wife
recovery for the loss of consortium, occasioned by the husband's
1. E.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Jones, 21 Colo. 340, 40 Pac. 891 (1895); Duffee
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 489, 77 N.E. 1036 (1906); Pritsker v. Greenwood, 47 R.I. 384, 133 AtI. 656 (1926); Cook v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 196
S.C. 230, 13 S.E.2d 1, 138 A.L.R. 1144 (1941). See POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 54 et
seq. (15th ed., Landon, 1951); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 938,
§ 102 (1941).
2. E.g., Baldwin v. Kansas City Rys., 231 S.W. 280 (Mo. App. 1921);
Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N.H. 289, 99 AtI. 298 (1916). The wife's
services, society, and sexual intercourse are generally said to constitute the
"consortium"; see Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1923).
S. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 941, n. 17 (1941).
4. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV.
177, 185, 194 (1916); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 946 (1941).
5. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23 A.L.R.2d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 946 (1941).
6. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 948 (1941).

7. E.g., Baldwin v. Kansas City Ry., 231 S.W. 280 (Mo. App. 1921). See

POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 171 (15th ed., Landon, 1951); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF

THE LAW OF TORTS 941, n. 17 (1941).
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wrongful injury.8 Recovery by the child in the instant case would
have been without precedent.
The District of Columbia is one of the jurisdictions allowing
the wife recovery for the loss of the injured husband's consortium. This probably induced plaintiff to bring the present action.
But the district court chose to be guided by other decisions of
its court of appeals, denying recovery to a child in actions for
the loss of a "family life," caused by defendant's enticement of
the child's parent away from home." Admitting the difference
between that action and the present one,10 the court nevertheless
regarded the decisions as indicating the unwillingness of the
appellate court to protect the child's interest in the guidance and
society of his parent generally.
Plaintiff would probably have fared no better in Louisiana.
In one respect, our courts accord more generous protection than
does the common law to the family's non-pecuniary interests in
each other's well being. With the minority," Louisiana courts, in
actions for wrongful death, allow recovery by the spouse for the
loss of consortium, by the parent for the loss of the child's affection and fellowship, and by the child for the loss of the parent's
advice and society.12 None of these losses will support an action if
the spouse, child or parent is not fatally injured, however.' 8 One
8. Hitaff er v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23 A.L.R.2d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Brown v. GeorgiaTennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953).
9. Edler v. McAlpine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950), following
McMillan v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
10. Fear of unfounded claims and extortionate practices and distaste for
the public airing of the facts involved have contributed to throwing the
action for alienation of affections out of favor in several states. Those factors
were not present in the instant case. See Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on
"Heart BaZml," 33 MicH. L. REv. 979 (1935); Note, 32 CORN. L.Q. 432 (1947).
11. Cases are collected in 74 A.L.R. 82 (1931).
12. Underwood v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, 128 La. 968, 55 So. 641
(1911); Poindexter v. Service Cab Co., 161 So. 40 (La. App. 1935) (deceased
spouse); Russell v. Taglialavore, 153 So. 44 (La. App. 1934) (same); Roby v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 130 La. 896, 58 So. 701 (1912) (deceased child);
Serpas v. Collard Motors, 178 So. 261 (La. App. 1938) (deceased parent)
semble. In the Underwood case the court said, "[11n an action by one of
the beneficiaries mentioned [in Article 2315 of the Civil Code] . . .for damages caused by the death of the mother, father, husband, or child, the mental
suffering of the plaintiff, resulting from the wound to the feelings, loss of
society, and of kindly offices, is an element which is to be considered equally
with the material or pecuniary loss." 128 La. 968, 995, 55 So. 641, 650 (1911).
13. Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851) (husband's consortium); Bea v. Russo, 21 So.2d 530 (La. App. 1945) (wife's consortium); see Grier v. Tri-State Transit Co., 36 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. La. 1940);
of. Lively v. State, 15 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1943) (husband, as administrator
of community, recovers expense of hiring housekeeper). Black v. The
Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855) (parent's mental suffering when child
injured); Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906) (parent's mental
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reason for this found in the jurisprudence is. that "[Louisiana]
has never had any law which authorized one person to recover
damages for injuries to his feelings, as a consequence of injury
sustained by another, still living, whether in his person, character, or feelings .... -14 (Italics supplied.) This states the result,
but explains it no more than to say that "actions for injury to the
person are personal."'15 Another reason found is that, in Louisiana, no member of a family has a "property" right to the
services of another; even wives and children do not occupy the
servile status of wives and children at common law.' 6 This reason
is not convincing, if the common law loss-of-services basis of the
husband's or parent's action is, as has been suggested, a fiction.
It is submitted that the true reasons for not allowing these family
relational interests more protection lie far beneath the surface
of most reported opinions. French treatises have dealt with this
subject and the views in two of them, one by Mazeaud (H. and
L.) and one by Savatier, 7 are especially instructive.
Neither of these treatises is opposed to the allowance of
damages for a purely moral-as distinguished from a materialinjury. But they disagree as to the proper basis for allowing such
recovery. 8 MM. Mazeaud are of the opinion that recovery for
moral damage is compensatory in nature. Admitting that money
anguish

when child

unlawfully

arrested);

of.

Koob

v.

Cooperative

Cab

Co., 213 La. 903, 35 So.2d 849 (1948) (injured child's parent recovers for use
and benefit of child).

14. Kaufman v. Clark, 141 La. 316, 320, 75 So. 65, 66 (1917).
15. Black v. The Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33, 40 (1855).

16. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927); see Art. 226,
LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
17. MAZEAUD, H. & L., TRAIT6 THEORIQUE ST PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSA13ILITA
CIVILS DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE (3d ed. 1938); SAVATIER, TRAITt DE LA
RESPONSABILIT9 CIVILS

EN DROIT FRANgAIS

(2d ed. 1941).

Generally, in

France

only wrongful death allows the family to recover for their moral damage
caused by the injury of one of them. "Quand une personne souffre, sa
douleur se r6percute sur tous ceux qui Z'aiment. Mais les tribunaux n'admettent gure
que ce dommage d'affection fonde, chez ceux-ci, une action en
responsabilitd. Meme les parents d'un enfant devenu infirme ne peuvent
reclamer . . . reparation de leur propre douleur. Cependant, certaines
ddcisions accordent des dommages-intdrdts a un flaned pour un accident
ayant rendu la fiancee infirme, la veille du mariage; . . . 4 Z'epouse ou aux
parents d'un prisonnierpour la douleur d eux causde par une injuste arrestation. . . . Enfin, et surtout, un recent arrdt de la cour supreme adoucit sa
sdvdritd en ouvrant une indemnitd aux parents que L'tnfrmite de leur enfant
mlneur atteint trGs douloureusement dans leur affection." 2 SAVATIER, supra at
104, § 538. A wife has similarly recovered for her moral damage caused by

her husband's insanity, resulting from his wrongful injury. LALOU, TRAIT2
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITh CIVILE § 156 (4th ed. 1949).

18. The Louisiana Supreme Court has had difficulty with the question of
the proper basis of recovery for moral damage. A good example is Underwood v. Gulf Refining Co., 128 La. 968, 55 So. 641 (1911),

holding recovery

for such damage to be compensatory, not punitive, after a lengthy discussion
of the question.
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cannot perfectly repair injured sensibilities, they argue that
money gives the plaintiff the best means the law has available
to restore to his "moral patrimony" that which the defendant
wrongfully took from it. 19 Under the legislation obliging "him
by whose fault damage is done" to repair it, they would allow all
persons morally damaged to sue the wrongdoer for money
damages. But, turning to the area of wrongful death and wrongful physical injury, they see danger of releasing, by the unrestricted application of that principle to those wrongs, a veritable avalanche of suits. 20 M. Savatier, on the other hand, abhors
the notion that the vulgar joy of receiving a sum of money can
compensate a plaintiff for suffering moral injuries. He takes the
position that recovery for such injuries represents the enforcement of a private penal justice.21 Since this is the case, a physically
injured person suing in his own behalf and recovering for the
moral damages he has suffered (pain and suffering, for example)
punishes the defendant and discharges his moral responsibility.
To allow the injured party's family to recover in a subsequent
action against the same defendant for the moral damage they
subjecting the defendant to double
have suffered would. be
22
punishment and abuse.
It is believed that the reality of the dangers to which these
writers point casts far more light upon the Louisiana jurisprudence and the present common law than does any loss-ofservices theory.23 The assessment of damages for a moral injury
is at best guesswork. 24 The defendant's culpability and capacity to
pay are apt to influence whoever is charged with fixing the
quantum of plaintiff's damages. To allow the defendant's blameworthiness and ample means to be repeatedly paraded before
the trier of fact by anyone aggrieved by the injured party's misfortune might well lead to abuse of the defendant. Moreover, the
danger of unleashing a host of claims for moral trifles is-unfortunately-probably not fanciful. The Supreme Court of Louisiana faced both of these dangers in actions for wrongful death.
They were avoided by granting the defendant in such actions the
19. 1 MAZEAUD, H. & L., TRAITi THAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITA
CIVILE DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 377 (3d ed. 1938).
20. Id. at 387.
21. 2 SAVATIER, TRAITh DE LA RESPONSABILITh CIVILE EN DROIT FRANQAIS 93
(2d ed. 1951).
22. Id. at 95.
23. Of. Pound, IndividuaZ Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH.
L. Rsv. 177, 194 (1916); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 948 (1941);
Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906) (opening the door).
24. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF DAMAGES 315, § 88 (1935).
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right to have cumulated in one suit the deceased's surviving
action and the wrongful death actions proper, vested in the
statutory beneficiaries. 25 No legislation compelled the court to
reach this result. A similar right of joinder might be given the
defendant in actions for wrongful injury and actions by others
for their moral injury, caused by the incapacity of the physically
injured. Then, as now, only one suit would follow each wrongful
injury and the defendant would have his wrongdoing and financial responsibility brought before the trier of fact only once. The
remaining question would then be, should the family's interests
in each other's well being be protected by allowing recovery for
the moral injury suffered by them as a result of the physical
injury of one member. This addresses itself purely to one's sense
of natural justice. The question has been answered in the affirmative by our Supreme Court in the area of wrongful death. 26
Surely the moral impact of a dear one's death is not necessarily
greater or of longer duration than that of his physical or mental
mutilation. Nor does it seem that the harm suffered by the
injured party's family is more directly or proximately caused by
the defendant's fault when death ensues than when it does not.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that "every person for
injury done him in his rights, lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have adequate remedy by due process of law and justice
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay."
Even to allow nominal damages to the aggrieved family would
seem more consistent with this provision than complete denial
of recovery.
Donald J. Tate

WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION-EMPLOYERS' RIGHTS
AGAINST THIRD PERSONS-NATURE

OF CLAIM

Plaintiff's employee had been fatally injured during the
course of and within the scope of his employment due to the
alleged negligence of the defendant. An action was brought
under La. R.S. 23:1101 by the employer against the defendant, a
third person tortfeasor, for amounts paid and to be paid under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law to the dependent il25. Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931); Norton v. Crescent
City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933).
26. See note 12 supra.
27. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 6.

